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ABSTRACT
The present study investigates the intersection of working memory and emotion
recognition in young adults with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and neurotypical controls.
The executive functioning theory of autism grounds key impairments within the cognitive realm,
whereas social-cognitive theories view social functioning impairments as primary. Executive
functioning theory of ASD has been criticized because executive functioning is too broad and is
composed of separable, component skills. In the current study, the focus is narrowed to one of
those components, working memory. It has been suggested that executive functioning may play
a role in effective social interactions. Emotion recognition is an important aspect of social
reciprocity, which is impaired in ASD. The current study investigates this hypothesis by
combining working memory and emotion recognition into a single task, the n-back, as a model
of social interaction and comparing performance between adults with ASD and controls. A

validated set of facial expression stimuli (NimStim) was modified to remove all extraneous
detail, and type of emotion was tightly controlled across 1-, 2-, and 3-back conditions. Results
include significantly lower accuracy in each of the working memory load conditions in the ASD
group compared to the control group, as well as in a baseline, maintenance memory task. The
control group’s reaction time increased as working memory load increased, whereas the ASD
group’s reaction time did not significantly vary by n-back level. The pattern of results suggests
that the limit for n-back with emotional expressions is 2-back, due to near chance level
performance in both groups for 3-back, as well as definitive problems in short term memory for
facial expressions of emotion in high-functioning individuals with ASD, in contrast to previous
findings of near perfect short memory for facial expressions in controls.
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INTRODUCTION

As fundamentally social beings, humans are immersed in environments built upon
interactional structures (families, communities, cultures, institutions, and societies) from which
the most basic aspects of behavior are learned. As children develop, social cognition, or the
ability to “perceive, categorize, remember, analyze, reason with, and behave toward other
conspecifics” (Pelphrey & Carter, 2008, p.283) becomes increasingly important for successful
social interaction. Individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have clinically significant
dysfunction in reciprocal social interaction, which involves social cognition, coupled with deficits
in communication and atypical repetitive/restricted interests. These social interaction deficits,
often conceptualized as the hallmark of ASD, include impaired awareness and decoding of
others’ emotional and interpersonal cues (Constantino et al., 2003), such as facial expressions
of emotion. Such deficits, in turn, impact social adjustment in day-to-day functioning (GarciaVillamisar, Rojahn, Zaja, & Jodra, 2010).
Several theories have been proposed, each of which attempt to provide a
comprehensive, cohesive account that spans all three domains of deficit in ASD. Different
theoretical models of ASD emphasize different constituent skills as key. One major theory, the
executive function theory of ASD (Bennetto, Pennington, & Rogers, 1996; Hughes & Russell,
1993; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991) grounds key impairments within a set of higherorder cognitive skills mediated by the prefrontal cortex. Deficits in these skills are thought to
underlie the problems individuals with ASD experience in everyday contexts, including
difficulties in adaptive (Gilotty, Kenworthy, Sirian, Black, & Wagner, 2002) and academic
functioning (Brock, Rimm-Kaufman, Nathanson, & Grimm, 2009). Criticisms of the executive
functioning theory of ASD point out that executive functions (as they are currently defined and
investigated) represent a complex set of cognitive functions that are separable and that many
tests designed to assess executive functioning tap several of these separate functions (Ozonoff,

2
South, & Provencal, 2005), making it difficult to determine which of the component processes
are disrupted and which are intact. Therefore, it may be useful to employ a focused approach to
investigating cognitive deficits in the ASD population by targeting component processes, such
as working memory, in isolation.
Social-cognitive theories place primacy of ASD-related dysfunction in the social domain
and focus on impairments in the capacity to represent and reason about the thoughts, beliefs,
and feelings of others, often referred to as Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Frith, Morton, &
Leslie, 1991). Behavioral studies in support of this theory include investigation of joint attention,
imitation, and pretend play in early development and, for older individuals with ASD, inferring
mental and emotional states using various social cues. It has been proposed that impairments
in social perception and behavior in ASD are due to disruptions in brain systems implicated in
social functioning, which include such structures as the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, superior
and middle temporal gyri, and fusiform gyrus (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2000).
Real-life social interactions likely draw heavily on both executive functioning and social
perception skills. Social interaction involves keeping track of a constantly changing stream of
perceived details, all the while keeping in mind socio-cultural norms as well as one’s own goals
for the interaction. The act of maintaining, updating, or manipulating information is
conceptualized as working memory, one of the component processes of executive functioning.
Working memory in ASD has been thoroughly investigated, and findings generally indicate
impairment in comparison to control populations (Minshew & Goldstein, 2001; Ozonoff &
Strayer, 2001; J. Russell, Jarrold, & Henry, 1996; Steele, Minshew, Luna, & Sweeney, 2007;
Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, & Minshew, 2005), though findings vary considerably depending
on several factors such as the complexity of the task and the type of stimuli employed (Steele et
al., 2007). Working memory tasks that incorporate social or emotional stimuli, which have been
employed in studies of typically developing individuals (Braver et al., 2001; Druzgal &
D'Esposito, 2001; Owen, McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005), provide one approach to

3
examining how executive functioning and social/emotional processing deficits may
independently or interactively contribute to impaired complex social functioning in day to day life
for individuals with ASD.
The extant literatures regarding either working memory or emotion recognition in
individuals with ASD are vast. However, there is a paucity of information available describing
how these two processes operate when they intersect in the ASD population. The emerging
area of research focusing on emotion-cognition integration in typically developing individuals
provides an intriguing impetus for investigation within the ASD population. One study to date
has partially extended this line of inquiry to the ASD population (Koshino et al., 2008), though
the focus was on facial identity recognition, not emotion recognition.
1.1

Purpose of the Study
The primary aim for the current study is to investigate working memory for emotionally

expressive faces in a sample of young adults with high functioning autism and typically
developing controls. A criticism of the executive functioning theory of ASD is addressed in the
current study. This criticism posits that executive functioning as a whole is composed of
separable component processes, any one of which may or may not be disrupted in autism.
Thus, in the current study the focus is narrowed within the domain of executive functioning to
one of its component skills, working memory. It can be argued that social reciprocity,
impairments in which are considered to be the hallmark of ASD, is also composed of separable,
component processes, one of which is recognition of emotions in facial expressions. Therefore,
the focus within the domain of social reciprocity is narrowed to recognition of facial expressions
of emotion.
By taking this approach, the manner in which working memory and emotion recognition
come together, or intersect, is investigated by examining the pattern of performance on an
emotion recognition task that increases parametrically in working memory load (see Figure
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2.2.3.2, p 35.). Use of such a task, commonly labeled an “n-back” paradigm, necessarily
imposes tight experimental control which could be viewed as reducing the ecological validity of
the findings. Though reducing the complex domains of executive functioning and social
reciprocity to working memory and emotion recognition is several steps removed from an in vivo
social interaction, the particular design of the task serves as a model of real-life social
interaction. It does so by requiring moment-to-moment updating of a constantly changing stream
of socially relevant information, as opposed to other experiments that employ more simple tasks
of facial expression matching or recall/recognition of facial identity.
The n-back task is a widely used working memory paradigm (Owen et al., 2005) that
entails varying levels of working memory load, and has been shown to activate prefrontal cortex
areas (Cohen et al., 1997). It involves viewing stimuli presented at a fixed rate, one after
another on a computer screen. The participant must indicate which stimulus is the same as the
one “n” positions ago. For example, the 1-back involves pressing a button when the stimulus
that is currently up on the screen is the same as the one immediately preceding, or one position
“back.” The 2-back involves pressing a button when the current stimulus is the same as the one
before the immediately preceding stimulus, or two positions “back.” The 3-back follows this
same rule. The emotion recognition aspect of the model resides in the type of stimuli employed
within the n-back task. The stimuli consist of a validated set of photographs of emotionally
expressive faces called the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2009).
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Figure 1.1. Visual representation of the domains of interest in the current study.
In order to lay a solid foundation for the current study, the following sections draw on a
number of distinct areas in the literature. First, literature on working memory in ASD will be
reviewed. Second, findings regarding facial emotion recognition in ASD will be reviewed. Third,
how the two domains intersect will be discussed in reviewing the emotion-cognition integration
literature.
1.1.1

Working memory in ASD

Executive functioning is defined as a set of capacities that underlie an individual’s ability
to engage in goal-directed, independent, self-serving behavior (Lezak, Howieson, Loring,
Hannay, & Fischer, 2004). These capacities generally include attentional shifting (mental
flexibility), inhibition, working memory, planning, and fluency (Engle, Kane, Tuholski, Miyake, &
Shah, 1999). Deficits have been demonstrated in individuals with ASD in the areas of setshifting (Liss et al., 2001; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Szatmari, Tuff, Finlayson, & Bartolucci,
1990), inhibition (Hill & Bird, 2006; Hughes & Russell, 1993; Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, &
Filloux, 1994), and working memory (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, & Rinaldi, 1998; Joseph,
McGrath, & Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Russo et al., 2007), as well as higher-order processes such
as planning, fluency, and cognitive control. However, the literature regarding executive
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functioning abilities in ASD is not unequivocal. A substantial minority of studies demonstrate
intact abilities such as spatial working memory (Barnard, Muldoon, Hasan, O'Brien, & Stewart,
2008) and inhibition (Ozonoff, 1997; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997; James
Russell, Jarrold, & Hood, 1999). The current study focuses on working memory.
Various models of working memory have been presented, including a widely accepted
conceptualization consisting of a central executive component that coordinates two subsystems
(phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad) that temporarily store information for immediate
problem-solving, early in the stream from perception to encoding in long-term memory
(Baddeley, 2003). The working memory literature in the ASD population is equivocal regarding
whether or not there truly are deficits in this population, though differences in methodology and
participant characteristics make direct comparisons across studies difficult. Studies vary in
terms of the domain tapped (verbal vs. nonverbal), sample characteristics, as well as in
experimental task.
Several kinds of tasks designed to target nonverbal working memory have been used in
behavioral studies in the ASD population. For example, Morris et al. (Morris et al., 1999)
employed an Executive Golf Task, which is a computer-administered spatial working memory
task that requires participants to identify targets successively further from the start point, without
selecting the same target twice within a trial. They found that adults with ASD performed more
poorly and exhibited more perseverative errors than the age-matched control group. Various
spatial span tasks including the Wechsler Memory Scale, 3rd Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, D.
1997B) Spatial Span subtest, the Finger Windows subtest of the Wide Range Assessment of
Memory and Learning (WRAML; Sheslow & Adams, 1990), the Corsi-Block-Tapping task (Corsi,
1972), the Spatial Working Memory subtest of the Cambridge Automated Neuropsychological
Test and Battery (CANTAB ©; Cambridge Cognition Cognition, 1996), and other block span
tasks have been used to demonstrate deficits in spatial working memory in adults and children
with ASD (Goldberg et al., 2005; Happe, Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006; Joseph et al., 2005;
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Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Williams, Goldstein, & Minshew, 2005; Zinke et al., 2010). Other types
of tasks that have revealed deficits in individuals with ASD in non-verbal working memory
include the NEPSY Knock Tap subtest (Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 1998), visual perspective
taking, and various others that involve having to recall a series of visual displays in sequence
(Joseph et al., 2005; Reed, 2002; J. Russell et al., 1996).
However, some types of working memory tasks such as CANTAB © Stockings of
Cambridge subtest, block span forward, NEPSY-II Tower subtest, and box search (Happe et al.,
2006; Joseph et al., 2005; Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001) have failed to elicit evidence of deficits in
ASD. Finally, the very same tasks that revealed group differences in some studies (e.g., block
span and variant visual pattern—remembering the sequence of a series of spatial displays)
failed to do so in other studies (Cui, Gao, Chen, Zou, & Wang, 2010). Differences in group
characteristics and other aspects of methodology makes comparisons across these studies
difficult. In general, the literature appears to provide more support for the presence of deficits in
nonverbal working memory in ASD than it does for the absence of deficits in this domain.
However, an important exception to this conclusion is that deficits have not been
revealed in ASD with one of the classic tests of working memory, the n-back. The n-back task
involves viewing or hearing a steady stream of stimuli, presented one after another, and the
participant must indicate when the current stimulus is the same as the one ‘n’ (e.g., 1, 2, or 3)
trials ago. Several studies have employed versions of the n-back task that incorporate varied
stimulus classes (spatial, digits, faces) in samples of individuals with ASD and control groups
and have failed to demonstrate group differences in terms of accuracy (Cui et al., 2010; Koshino
et al., 2008; Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001). Cui et al. (2010) found differences in reaction time,
whereas Koshino et al. (2008) did not. This exception has also been shown in more verbally
based n-back tasks (see below).
Methods to assess verbal working memory in ASD vary as well. Some studies, such as
those employing sentence span tasks (Bennetto et al., 1996; J. Russell et al., 1996), non-word
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repetition, and sentence imitation (Gabig, 2008) demonstrated poorer performance in ASD than
controls. In contrast, group differences were not revealed in studies that used other tasks
including WMS-III and WAIS-III Letter Number Sequencing subtests (Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, &
Lai, 2005; Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, et al., 2005), WRAML Number/Letter Memory
(Williams et al., 2005), and digit recall backward (Lopez et al., 2005; Cui et al., 2010). Yet other
studies have produced conflicting results for the same task (digit recall forward), including
poorer performance by the ASD group (Gabig et al., 2008), superior performance by the ASD
group (Cui et al., 2010), and comparable performance between ASD and control groups (Lopez
et al., 2005). In general, the literature appears to lend more support for a lack of deficit in verbal
working memory, despite the methodological inconsistencies across studies, which are also
seen in nonverbal working memory studies.
Similar to findings regarding the n-back with nonverbal stimuli, comparable performance
(in terms of accuracy) in ASD and control groups has been demonstrated using the classic nback task that employs letters as stimuli (Kana, Keller, Minshew, & Just, 2007; H. Koshino et al.,
2005; Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, et al., 2005) . In fact, Williams et al. (2005) found that
error rates in both ASD and control groups were so low that they did not pursue analyses based
on accuracy, though the ASD group demonstrated slower reaction times. Additionally, one of
those studies also employed digits as stimuli for the n-back task, which could be considered a
verbally-based task if verbally mediated strategies are used; this study also failed to reveal
group differences (Cui et al., 2010).
Few studies have investigated neural correlates of working memory performance in ASD
using neuroimaging techniques, and even fewer have employed the n-back task to assess the
effect of increasing working memory load or have investigated working memory for
social/emotional information in ASD and control groups. Luna et al. (2002), employed an
oculomotor delayed response task with eye tracking and fMRI procedures and found that not
only did the ASD group demonstrate poorer performance at the behavioral level, which the
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authors attributed to decreased activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and in posterior
cingulate cortex in comparison to healthy controls. Kana et al. (2007) investigated simple
response inhibition, as well as a 1-back inhibition (pressing a button for all stimuli except for one
that is the same as the one presented 1 trial ago) with letters, which failed to elicit behavioral
group differences in accuracy or reaction time, but which yielded increased activation in bilateral
premotor areas for both tasks, as well as less synchrony between anterior cingulate inhibition
network and parietal regions during the 1-back task in the ASD group compared to controls.
Koshino and colleagues conducted a series of fMRI studies in ASD and control groups,
one with the n-back task using letters as stimuli (2005) and the other using faces (2008) where
the task response was based on facial identity. In both studies, behavioral group differences in
terms of accuracy or reaction time were not apparent. With the letter n-back, the ASD group
demonstrated not only less activation than controls in some left frontal and parietal areas
(dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, posterior precentral sulcus, inferior parietal
lobe) but also more activation than controls in some right frontal and parietal areas (inferior
frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobe). Furthermore, functional connectivity analysis showed
that the ASD group’s left and right frontal regions were synchronized with right parietal areas,
whereas the control group’s left and right frontal regions were synchronized with left parietal
areas. The authors interpreted this pattern of results as evidence for controls using a verbally
mediated strategy and ASD participants using a more visually mediated strategy to perform the
task. Lastly, the ASD group appeared to have a smaller working memory network, which only
included eight ROIs, whereas the control group showed 11.
In Koshino and colleagues’ 2008 study of n-back with face stimuli, the ASD group
demonstrated comparable performance at the behavioral level again, but less activation in left
inferior prefrontal and right posterior temporal areas, which are associated with working memory
and theory of mind, respectively, as well as activations in slightly different areas of the fusiform
area in comparison to controls. Again, they found smaller activated networks, but in the 2008
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study they also found less synchrony indicating underconnectivity in fusiform-frontal networks.
In sum, several intriguing findings have been published about working memory neural network
differences in ASD vs. controls, but interpretation in the absence of corresponding behavioral
differences is difficult.
It has been suggested that failure to reveal deficits at the behavioral level in some
studies may be an artifact of a facilitative effect of computer administered tasks, as opposed to
tasks administered by a person, given the significant social interaction difficulties in ASD
(Nakahachi et al., 2006; Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001). The implication here is that the act of
administering a task in person is a social interaction of its own accord, and that this may
interfere with task performance. However, this speculative hypothesis does not explain all of the
equivocal findings regarding executive functioning in ASD, given that performance on several
computer administered visuo-spatial working memory tasks such as the n-back (colored
shapes), spatial span (colored shapes at varying distances from a target), and box search task
did not reveal significant differences across groups, but did reveal the expected main effect of
working memory load in each of the groups. Furthermore, another study using tasks
administered by a person (letter number sequencing in Williams et al., 2005) did not reveal
deficits. Other explanations for conflicting results, as mentioned above, include differences in
group characteristics across studies such as age (children vs. adults) or IQ, or within group
heterogeneity in the ASD group such as varying degrees of severity of social and/or
communication impairments.
In general, the literature suggests that deficits in working memory become apparent
when the level of task complexity is sufficient (Steele et al., 2007). It can be argued that the nback task with simple stimuli such as letters, digits, or geometric shapes are not complex
enough to reveal group differences. One way to increase complexity of the task would be to
employ a socially-salient stimulus, such as an emotionally expressive face. This approach is
undertaken in the current study.
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1.1.2

Face processing and emotion perception

Deficits in face processing in general and emotion recognition in particular are well
documented in the ASD literature. Many researchers attribute the difficulty individuals with ASD
demonstrate in emotion perception, or in facial processing in general, to differences between
individuals with ASD and controls in the style of cognitive processing employed during
perception of complex visual stimuli (Frith 1989). In the typically developing population,
perception of faces and other complex stimuli is an automatic process achieved by global or
holistic processing (Behrmann et al., 2006; Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; De Sonneville
et al., 2002; Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003; Lahaie et al., 2006). In contrast,
individuals with ASD may employ a more piecemeal approach to processing complex
information, in accordance with the “weak central coherence” theory (Frith, 1989).
According to this theory, those with ASD demonstrate a deficit in global, holistic
processing of complex information, including human faces, that is characterized by a bias
toward feature-level visual analysis and a piecemeal approach. The weak central coherence
theory has been used to explain peculiarities in face processing in the ASD population despite
accurate facial identity task performance (Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner, & Tardif, 2004). For
example, the ASD group achieved facial identity task performance comparable to that of verbal
and mental age-matched controls when viewing faces presented in high spatial frequency (local,
featural-level processing), whereas only the control group was able to identify faces presented
in low spatial frequency properties (global, configural-level processing).
Though earlier studies couched the weak central coherence account within a deficit
model (impaired global processing), later investigations reconceptualized this phenomenon in
ASD as a local processing bias or a preferred cognitive style, with evidence of the ability to
integrate information into a gestalt, global whole when specifically cued to do so (Happe et al.,
2006). For example, performance by individuals with ASD on tasks that require disembedding a
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target featural detail from a gestalt whole has been found to be superior to that of a typically
developing control group (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997). This notion of a preferred style can be
extended to emotionally salient stimuli. For example, Celani and colleagues (1999) reported that
children with ASD initially and spontaneously sorted pictures of faces according to nonemotional aspects, whereas the TD group initially sorted according to facial expression.
However, when the participants with ASD were specifically instructed to sort according to
emotion, the children did so at a comparable level to the TD group (Celani, Battacchi, &
Arcidiacono, 1999).
Within the broad area of face processing research, the literature regarding emotion
perception and recognition is reviewed. Many researchers have described general, overall
deficits in facial emotion perception in the ASD population (Baron-Cohen, Golan, & Ashwin,
2009; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Klin et al., 1999; Philip et al., 2010). Some studies do not
reveal groups differences in detecting simple emotions such as happy and angry faces, but
suggest instead that deficits are limited to complex emotional expressions such as confusion
(Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001;
Bauminger & Kasari, 1999; Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Golan, 2008). Other studies have revealed
less specificity and reliability in facial emotion recognition in high-functioning adults with ASD
(Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). Comparable emotion recognition ability between adolescents with
ASD and typically developing controls has been demonstrated with exposure times as short as
250ms, but with structured response formats, such as multiple choice (Weng et al., 2011).
These findings are in stark contrast to the near perfect short term memory for facial expression
of emotion demonstrated in typically developing individuals (Banko, Gal, & Vidnyanszky, 2009).
Of the features in a facial expression that convey emotional content, the eye region is
the area that conveys the most emotional information and the area to which typically developing
individuals attend, though the mouth region tends to be the area to which individuals with ASD
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attend (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). If a piecemeal strategy in facial processing is employed, it is
conceivable that with adequate cognitive resources and time for processing, those “pieces”
could eventually be integrated into a gestalt whole, leading to accurate, though inefficient,
performance on emotion perception tasks. Indeed, researchers have speculated about
compensatory strategies that may account for null findings in the facial emotion recognition in
ASD literature (Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010; Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). However, a global
processing bias would allow for more efficient decoding, freeing up cognitive resources that
could be allocated to processing more information while allowing for simultaneous formulation of
appropriate responses during social interaction, as is done in the typically developing
population.
In the emotion recognition literature, like the working memory literature, factors that may
account for conflicting findings have been identified. These include group characteristics (age,
level of functioning), stimuli and task demands, and the dependent variable of interest (accuracy
vs. reaction time for behavioral studies) (Harms et al., 2010). It has also been suggested that
heterogeneity within ASD samples that include participants with very mild social cognition
symptoms may highlight the lack of sensitivity in some tests and that increasing the difficulty of
the task avoids ceiling effects by precluding the use of compensatory strategies (Harms et al.,
2010).
Attempts to probe further into the nature of emotion perception difficulties in ASD have
used functional neuroimaging to demonstrate differing patterns of activation at the neural
systems level in ASD vs. typical control groups. For example, Weng et al. (Weng et al., 2011)
investigated neural activation patterns while participants viewed emotionally expressive and
neutral faces. Their results indicated greater activation in participants with ASD than in controls
in ventral prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and striatum while viewing expressive vs. neutral faces.
After acquisition of fMRI image, participants also completed a multiple choice response format
emotion labeling task. Group differences on this task were not revealed in terms of accuracy or
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reaction time. Koshino and colleagues (2008) also investigated neural activation patterns during
an n-back task using faces as stimuli, though the task focused on facial identity rather than
emotional expression. This study will be discussed in more detail later (section 1.1.3, p. 18).
Notably, the stimuli used included both neutral and non-neutral faces, which potentially
obscured the results, as literature regarding differing patterns of cortical activation for
recognition of facial identity vs. emotion recognition have been reported (D'Argembeau & Van
der Linden, 2011; Krebs et al., 2011).
One approach to investigating the effects of increasing the difficulty level of an emotion
recognition task would be to embed it within a working memory paradigm with parametric
variation in level of difficulty. In other words, employing a task that requires integration of
emotion and cognition may increase the sensitivity of a task and thus facilitate demonstrating
putative group differences in ASD vs. typically developing controls. Researchers have taken this
approach to emotion-cognition integration in the typically developing population (Neta & Whalen
2010) (see below). This is the approach taken in the present study.
1.1.3

Emotion-cognition integration

Historically, cognition and emotion were regarded as separate entities in psychological
research. However, modern views generally suggest an interdependent, interconnected system
(Pessoa, 2008). Some researchers have proposed that deficits in executive functioning may
impact social functioning in individuals with ASD, given the need for individuals to cope with
rapidly changing verbal and nonverbal stimuli that occur in natural social discourse, to select
appropriate responses to these cues, and to hold social norms and unspoken rules of
engagement on line throughout the subtle and fluid stream of changing stimuli (Bennetto et al.,
1996; Gilotty et al., 2002; McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993; Reed, 2002). Others have
hypothesized that Theory of Mind, or the ability to reason about others’ points of view and
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emotional states as separate from one’s own, is closely related to or dependent upon adequate
development of executive functioning skills (Benson, Sabbagh, Carlson, & Zelazo, 2013).
Given that executive functioning and social cognition are the foci of two competing
theories of ASD, combined with recent views of interconnected rather than separable systems,
the question of the nature of the relationship between executive functioning and social
impairments seen in ASD is raised. Indeed, significant correlations have been reported between
performance on executive functioning measures, including perseverative errors, and joint
attention behaviors in young children with autism (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers,
1999; McEvoy et al., 1993). Finally, relations between performance on executive functioning
tests and Theory of Mind tasks have been reported among children with autism (Ozonoff et al.,
1991), though findings in typically developing children suggest that the association is
developmentally based, with some types of executive functioning skills serving as a prerequisite
for Theory of Mind skills (Benson et al., 2013). A model of executive functioning that has been
proposed includes cognitive functions associated with abstract reasoning or “cold” cognitive
functions as well as those based on motivation and emotion, or “hot” functions (Barendse et al.,
2013; Zelazo, Qu, & Kesek, 2010).
As mentioned earlier, deficits in working memory in ASD emerge when the complexity of
visual stimuli is increased (Minshew & Goldstein, 2001). One way to increase the complexity of
visual stimuli for working memory tasks is to add an emotionally salient component. A number of
previous studies have examined the use of affectively-valenced stimuli within working memory
paradigms. In typically developing individuals, the addition of emotional content to working
memory tasks can have an detrimental effect on working memory processes (Perlstein, Elbert,
& Stenger, 2002), including allocating more attention to emotionally salient stimuli (Ohman,
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) and disrupting emotion labeling ability (Phillips, Channon, Tunstall,
Hedenstrom, & Lyons, 2008).
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Investigations at the neural systems level in typically developing population have yielded
results that suggest distinctive activation patterns for the integration of cognition and emotion.
For example, Perlstein and colleagues (2002) found that error rates were higher during the
presentation of affectively valenced vs. neutral stimuli during a working memory task. Further,
fMRI analyses revealed that in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, activity was increased for pleasant
stimuli relative to neutral and decreased for unpleasant stimuli, whereas the reverse pattern was
found in orbitofrontal cortex. In this study, the stimuli were photographic scenes of various
scenarios, not necessarily human faces. However, the connections between behavioral and
neuroimaging results are questionable, given that the original task that produced the
neuroimaging results had significant ceiling effects, and a separate group of participants
completed a modified version of the behavioral task (but not in the scanner) for behavioral error
rate analysis.
In a later study, Kensiger and Corkin (2003) found in typically developing adults that
affective valence did not influence working memory performance, neither on a self-ordered
pointing task nor on a backward word span task, though there was an effect of affective valence
on long term recall. Others have integrated emotion and cognition and found a distributed
pattern of activation in frontal (inferior, middle, and superior frontal gyri), parietal (inferior
parietal lobe, intraparietal sulcus), and occipital (lingual and fusiform gyri) areas during an
auditory n-back task in which a neutrally valenced word was spoken in various emotional tones
(Rama et al., 2001), and yet others found increased right-hemisphere ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex activation during n-back for faces vs. words (Braver et al., 2001).
Even more specific to the current study, researchers have investigated the association
between working memory and recognition of facial expressions of emotion, not just general
socially/emotionally-relevant stimuli, in typically developing individuals. Lopresti and colleagues
(LoPresti et al., 2008) used facial expressions of emotion in a delayed match to sample task for
emotions vs. identity to demonstrate differential patterns of activation. Superior temporal sulcus
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and inferior occipital cortex areas showed more activation in stimulus presentation vs. delayed
maintenance phases, and the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus were more
activated during the delay. Orbitofrontal areas demonstrated increased activation for the
emotion task relative to the identity task, both during stimulus presentation and during the active
maintenance phase that followed.
The classic n-back task, a measure of working memory, uses simple stimuli (letters,
objects) as targets and non-targets (Krebs et al., 2011; Veltman, Rombouts, & Dolan, 2003).
However, researchers have recently included more complex emotionally-valenced stimuli in the
n-back task such as pictures of affectively-valenced scenes (Dohnel et al., 2008) in controls vs.
individuals with mild cognitive impairment and found differing patterns of activation in the
precuneus according to valence of stimuli.
Others have employed cropped photos of facial expressions as flanking distracters to
simple stimuli in pediatric depression and anxiety (Ladouceur et al., 2005), 2005) and have
revealed differential allocation of attention resources according to valence of emotional
distracters. Schematic drawings of faces have also been included in working memory
paradigms (Beneventi, Barndon, Ersland, & Hugdahl, 2007); studies using such paradigms have
yielded evidence that facial feature specific working memory interaction with a general cognitive
load component were associated with significant activations in prefrontal regions of the brain.
Probing further, combining working memory tasks with face stimuli has been conducted in
typically developing individuals. For example, investigations regarding cortical activation
patterns specific to n-back for gray-scale faces, during which the participants were to respond to
the identity of the faces, revealed significant linear increases in fusiform face area activation
associated with increases in working memory load (Druzgal & D'Esposito, 2001). Neta and
Whalen (2011) demonstrated differential performance and cortical activation patterns for
emotion recognition vs. facial identity during 2-back performance in a typical adult sample, with
better performance on the identity task, emotion task-related activation in superior temporal
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sulcus and inferior frontal gyrus, and identity task related activation in anterior cingulate,
precuneus, and temporo-parietal junction, as well as increases in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
activity for both conditions (Neta & Whalen, 2011).
Similarly, others (Gray, Braver, & Raichle, 2002) investigated cortical activation patterns
during letter vs. face 3-back tasks after inducing either positive or negative emotional states by
having participants watch movie clips before task completion. Remarkably, their sample of
healthy adults demonstrated no main effect of type of task, but a crossover effect of enhanced
word 3-back performance with positive emotion state and impaired word 3-back performance
with negative emotion state, with the opposite pattern for face 3-back performance.
Furthermore, regions of interest (lateral prefrontal cortex) showed the greatest activation during
the task/state combinations with enhanced performance (word-unpleasant and face-pleasant),
less activation in the neutral conditions, and even less in the conditions with impaired
performance (word-pleasant and face-unpleasant). In sum, a precedent for investigating the
effect of emotional content on working memory process at both the behavioral and neural levels
in typical and clinical populations has been established.
This recent evidence for the specificity of activation patterns during emotion-cognition
integration in prefrontal regions in controls (Gray et al., 2002) provides an intriguing impetus for
examining this phenomenon in ASD, given demonstrated deficits in both emotional and
cognitive domains. In the ASD literature, studies using the classic n-back paradigm with simple
stimuli (letters, geometric shapes) indicate comparable accuracy in comparison to neurotypical
controls (Cui, Gao, Chen, Zou, & Wang, 2010; Koshino et al., 2005; Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001;
Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, et al., 2005). However, significant differences in reaction time
(Cui et al., 2010) and reduced prefrontal activation were observed. Koshino and colleagues
conducted an fMRI study in high-functioning adults with ASD using face stimuli in an n-back
task (Koshino et al., 2008). Neuroimaging results indicated reduced left prefrontal and right
superior temporal activation and less functional connectivity in the ASD group than the control
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group. However, the task was based on responding to facial identity recognition, not on emotion
recognition, despite the fact that the stimuli consisted of emotionally expressive (not just neutral)
faces Other methodological weaknesses, such as varying levels of zoom and or extraneous
detail in the stimuli, may have contributed to their lack of significant findings at the behavioral
level, though they did demonstrate group differences at the neural level. The current study has
potential to address this gap in the literature regarding working memory specifically for
emotional expressions in the ASD population
Although there is some evidence for short-term memory for faces being a weakness in
ASD (Hauck, Fein, Maltby, Waterhouse, & Feinstein, 1998; Wallace, Coleman, & Bailey, 2008;
Williams, Goldstein, & Minshew, 2005), no studies with ASD samples have used the n-back
paradigm to target responses to facial expressions of emotion to directly investigate parametric
variation of working memory load. Two studies have come close to this design. As described in
the introduction section, Koshino and colleagues (2008) compared n-back performance using
faces as stimuli between a sample of high-functioning individuals with ASD and full-scale and
verbal IQ matched controls. However, the task was to respond to facial identity. The authors
reported that there were no group differences at the behavioral level, and that both groups
showed expected patterns of medial frontal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus activation associated
with working memory tasks and fusiform activation associated with face perception. However,
they also found that the ASD group showed more right hemisphere lateralization of frontal
activation and less activation of superior and middle gyri of the posterior temporal lobes (areas
important for processing social information) than the control group.
Of note, a potential confound of Koshino et al.’s (2008) experimental task was that the
facial stimuli used were emotionally expressive, though the task was a facial identification task,
and there is no mention of systematic variation or controlling for this variable. If emotional
expression was constant for a particular facial identity stimulus (person X is always smiling,
person Y is always frowning), featural level information (e.g., frowning mouth) could have been
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used to perform the identity task, without recognition of the emotional expression or identity per
se. Furthermore, the stimuli included other uncontrolled visual variations (e.g., differences in
orientation, zoom level, or presence of eyeglasses and other articles of clothing) that could have
diverted attention away from the emotionally salient aspects of the stimuli (Krebs et al., 2011).
Not only could such attentional diversion have affected the results at the behavioral
level, but also at the neural level, given research that shows differing neural networks for facial
identification vs. (facial) emotion perception (Calder & Young, 2005; D'Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2011; Haxby, Petit, Ungerleider, & Courtney, 2000). Neta and colleagues (2011)
conducted a study similar to Koshino and colleagues (2005) using emotionally expressive faces
and fMRI with healthy adults within the context of an n-back task, where the task also varied
according to whether participants responded to facial identity or emotional expression. They
found that participants were more accurate and had faster reaction times for identity than for
emotion in the 2-back task. Furthermore, the emotion task elicited greater activation in the right
posterior superior temporal sulcus and bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, whereas the identity task
elicited greater activation in the rostral/ventral anterior cingulate cortex and bilateral precuneus,
and right temporo-parietal junction. Finally, conjunction analyses revealed that bilateral
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulated cortex, bilateral superior parietal lobule,
fusiform gyrus, and other visual areas were activated for both tasks.
1.1.4

Summary and current Study

Working memory deficits may contribute to the significant social disability high
functioning individuals with ASD experience in their day-to-day lives. Clarifying both the
behavioral manifestations and the neural underpinnings of these difficulties will advance our
understanding of the deficits observed in real-world social interactions, and may have the
potential to inform intervention approaches for individuals with ASD. Considering 1) the
conflicting evidence for emotion recognition deficits in ASD, 2) lack of deficit in both verbal and
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nonverbal n-back performance, and 3) suggestions to increase task difficulty as a method to
investigate working memory differences in ASD vs. typical controls, the stage is set for the
current study.
The primary aim was to examine the interactive contribution of both working memory
and emotion recognition integrated into a single task. This integrated task could be
conceptualized as a simplified model for the process of social interaction (maintaining and
updating emotionally salient stimuli). Further, it also imposes experimental constraints that
permit focusing on component skills within the domains of executive functioning and social
reciprocity, as related theories have been criticized for being based in domains that are too
broad.
The results of the current study partially extend previous findings in an adult control
population (Neta & Whalen, 2011) to adults with ASD. This study also advances the literature by
including parametric variation of working memory load such that patterns of performance with
increasing load can be examined. Additionally, the potential confounds in the Koshino et al.
(2008) study were addressed by limiting the task to emotion recognition only, with careful and
systematic variation in facial identity to preclude unintentional responding to identity instead of
emotion, as well as by cropping out extraneous, non-social details in the stimuli. The results of
the current study address a gap in the literature regarding working memory for socially and
emotionally salient stimuli in a population of individuals with ASD, recently referred to as “hot”
executive functioning. This study draws from neuropsychological theories of ASD including the
executive functioning theory, the weak central coherence theory, and social cognitive theories,
using a methodologically rigorous design with potential to have clinically useful applications,
such as informing development of intervention strategies (Baltruschat et al., 2011).
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1.2

Hypotheses
Hypotheses were formulated for accuracy data only. Previous research (Tracy, Robins,

Schriber, & Solomon, 2011) has demonstrated that individuals with ASD are able to identify a
target emotion accurately among a set of matches and non-matches, given sufficient time to
view the stimuli (Soulieres, Mottron, Giguere, & Larochelle, 2011). Additionally, intact
maintenance memory for non-verbal stimuli in ASD has also been demonstrated (Bennetto et
al., 1996; Mottron, Morasse, & Belleville, 2001). Therefore, group differences on the
maintenance memory (0-back) task seemed unlikely. Reaction time hypotheses were not
formulated as there is insufficient basis in the extant literature. Reaction time analyses were
carried out for exploratory purposes only.
1.2.1

Hypothesis 1

It was hypothesized that both groups would demonstrate lower accuracy as working
memory load levels increases. More specifically, 3-back performance will be significantly less
accurate than 2-back, and 2-back performance will be significantly less accurate than 1-back.
1.2.2

Hypothesis 2

It was hypothesized that a significant interaction effect would be demonstrated, such that
the ASD group would show lower accuracy on the 2-back condition (Hypothesis 2a) and the 3back condition (Hypothesis 2b) than would the control group. Because demands for emotion
processing are low when the task only requires detection of back-to-back targets it was not
expected that 1-back condition performance would significantly differ across groups.
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2.1

METHOD

Sample and Participant Selection
2.1.1

Sample Size

An a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1.3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) and indicated that 34 participants would be required for the present study
design. However, further inspection of extant literature using similar experimental designs,
(mixed ANOVA, also called split-plot designs) suggested that accurately estimating effect size,
power, and therefore appropriate sample size is a more complex process than the G*Power
program can handle (Bakeman, 2005). Furthermore, the experimental task in the current study
has not yet been conducted in an ASD population, so estimates of effect size were not available
to more accurately calculate the required sample size for the present design. In consultation
with faculty members at Georgia State University who have expertise in research design and
statistical analytic methods, it was recommended that recruiting a sample of 60 participants
would be a conservative approach by doubling the rule of thumb of 5 participants per cell, and
thus more than enough data points to ensure sufficient power. However, response to
recruitment efforts was very low despite persistent efforts to reach out to the ASD community in
both Atlanta and Miami, including increasing the compensation from $10 to $30. The
dissertation committee was petitioned for permission to cease data collection after 32 controls
and 19 ASD individuals had participated, and permission was granted based on preliminary
analysis results and ability to address the key questions of the study. Furthermore, several
published studies employed similar sample sizes, which were sufficient to reveal group
differences (Cui et al., 2010; Gabig, 2008; Goldberg et al., 2005; Kana et al., 2007; Kennedy &
Adolphs, 2012; Landa & Goldberg, 2005; Lopez et al., 2005; Nakahachi et al., 2006).
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2.1.2

Recruitment

Participants were recruited in Atlanta, GA and Miami, FL via various strategies. These
include direct emails to participants in previous studies that included ASD samples; in-person
presentations at local community support groups; flyers posted at Georgia State University, the
University of Miami, and distributed at Autism Society of America local chapter events and other
community events targeted to individuals with developmental disabilities; messages posted on
ASD community listservs; and word of mouth communication with the help of local clinicians
who serve the ASD population. Participants were also recruited from the undergraduate
participant pool through the web-based recruitment system (SONA) at Georgia State University,
and a large database of individuals who gave permission at organizations and events related to
the ASD community in the greater Atlanta area for lab members to contact them about new
research studies.
2.1.3

Participants

Participants were individuals between the ages of 16 and 30 years who were diagnosed with
an autism spectrum disorder and healthy controls without an autism spectrum disorder. Males
and females were included. All participants were fluent and dominant in English, based on self
report. All participants had either normal or corrected to normal vision. A total of 51 individuals
participated in the study; 32 control and 19 with ASD. Control participants were overenrolled
due to simultaneous enrollment in both Miami and Atlanta. Participants were screened for
central nervous system disorders, brain tumors or injuries, and psychiatric conditions, as these
have the potential to interfere with recognition of emotional expressions. Six participants’ data
were excluded from analyses. One participant from the ASD group demonstrated inability to
comprehend the task requirements despite IQ that was within normal limits, as evidenced by
poor performance on practice tasks, and was excluded from participation. One control group
participant was excluded due to reported depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Two

25
controls and two participants with ASD were excluded from data analyses due to response bias
and inattention to the experimental task. The final sample included 29 control and 16 ASD
participants. Response bias was determined by summing each participant’s number of YES
responses and NO responses across all conditions of the experiment, to obtain a mean and
standard deviation for both. Additionally, total number of trials in which there was no response
was also summed across conditions. Participants whose total number of YES, NO, or no
response trials fell outside two standard deviations of the mean for the whole sample were
excluded from analyses. Incidentally, the participants who were identified using this method
were the same participants who demonstrated obvious signs of inattention or unwillingness to
comply with instructions based on behavioral observations during data collection. See Table
2.1.3.1.
Table 2.1.3.1. Means and standard deviations for response type, to check for response bias for
all enrolled participants (n=51).
Type of response
M (SD)
Number of trials with “Yes” responses
96.66 (20.45)
Number of trials with “No” responses
108.96 (16.24)
Number of trials with no response (blank)
6.46 (8.58)
Number of trials with 2 responses (2nd response same as 1st)
2.12 (8.27)
Number of trials with 2 responses (2nd response different from 1st)
1.38 (3.26)

Group characteristics (means and standard deviations) for age, years of education, verbal
IQ, performance IQ, full-scale IQ, and Autism Screening Quotient (AQ) scores are presented in
Table 2.1.3 2. Groups did not significantly differ on age (p=.227), years of education (p=.124), or
PIQ (p=.105). Significant group differences were found in VIQ (p=.025) and AQ (p <.001).
Proportions of the groups based on sex and racial identity are significantly different in the two
groups (Table 2.1.3.3). Scores on IQ measures were not used as covariates, despite significant
difference in verbal IQ between groups, as recent arguments against such practices provide a
compelling argument for breaking with this longstanding tradition (Dennis et al., 2009).
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Table 2.1.3.2. T-test results for demographics, estimates of VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ, and AQ and
SCQ descriptive.
Control (n=29)
ASD (n=16)
Variable
M
SD
M
SD
t
Df
sig
Age (years)
20.34
3.131
21.63
3.739
-1.225
43
p=.227
Education (years)
14.24
2.655
13.06
1.879
1.569
43
p=.124
VIQ (T score)
56.34
7.911
48.69
11.394
2.389
23.16 p=.025*
PIQ (T score)
51.72
5.637
55.69
8.388
-1.691
22.65 p=.105
FSIQ (standard score)
106.76 10.858
103.75
15.665
0.683
23.14 p=.501
AQ (raw score) (n=41)
14.32
4.563
27.31
8.489
-5.179
15.31 p<.001*
SCQ (raw score) (n=10)
21.10
7.68
* Age is in years, education is in years, VIQ and PIQ are T-scores, FSIQ is presented as a
standard score, and AQ is presented as a raw score.

Table 2.1.3.3. Proportions of sex and racial identity, by group.
Control (n=29)
ASD (n=16)
Males
6.9%
68.8%
Females
93.1%
31.3%
African American
48.3%
0%
Asian
3.4%
0%
Caucasian
37.9%
50%
Hispanic
10.3%
31.3%
Bi- and Multi-Racial
0%
12.6%

2.2

Assessments and Measures

2.2.1

ASD symptom and IQ measures
ASD diagnosis was confirmed with Module 4 of the Autism Diagnostic Observation

Scale, 2nd Edition (ADOS-2; Lord et al., 2000), which is intended for adolescents and adults who
are verbally fluent. When caregivers for ASD participants were available, they completed the
Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, and Lord, 2003) a 40-item, forced
choice (Yes vs. No) caregiver questionnaire that queries the lifetime presence of behaviors
characteristic of individuals with ASD. The SCQ is based on the diagnostic algorithm of the
Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R) which, along with the ADOS, is considered the
gold standard for establishing new ASD diagnoses.
The ADI-R, an extensive caregiver interview that can last 45 minutes or longer and that
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assesses symptoms of ASD based on DSM-IV TR criteria and provides cutoff scores for
diagnostic classification has, along with the ADOS, been considered gold standards for
establishing new diagnoses. Although both are traditionally included in numerous published
studies, most current studies tend to eliminate the ADI-R for participants with diagnosis that are
already established, for feasibility reasons. Thus, the SCQ was included with the intent of using
it as a proxy for the ADI-R.
All participants completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), a 50-item self-report that measures the degree
to which a person endorses traits associated with an ASD. The items are constructed to tap the
following five areas: social skill, attention switching, attention to detail, communication, and
imagination. The AQ and SCQ are not diagnostic assessments, but instead serve primarily as
means to corroborate a reported history of ASD diagnosis for the ASD group. Exclusion criteria
for the control group included scores above the suggested cutoff score of 26 on the AQ
(Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005) or 15 on the SCQ.
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, 2nd Edition (Wechsler, 2011) was
administered as a brief screen to ensure adequate intellectual capacity to understand task
instructions. Participants whose full-scale IQ scores were less than 70 were to be excluded.
However, given that high-functioning individuals with ASD were specifically recruited, none of
the participants’ IQs were lower than 70.
All participants in the ASD group met criteria for an autism spectrum disorder based on
the ADOS. Only 10 ASD participants had caregivers available and willing to complete the SCQ
on the day of data collection. Participants who did not have a caregiver available on the day of
data collection were asked to take home an SCQ form and a postage-paid envelope addressed
to the PI, so that their primary caregiver could complete it and send it back to the PI. However,
none of the SCQs were returned via this method. Therefore, SCQ data are missing for six
participants, and thus, the SCQ was not utilized as an inclusion criterion. Of the 10 who did
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have completed SCQs, 8 met the suggested cutoff score of 15 as an indicator of possible ASD,
though the authors of the SCQ recommend a lower threshold if other risk factors are also
present. AQ data are missing for one control participant and three ASD participants, due to
refusal to complete the questionnaire. The suggested cutoff score of 26 has been shown to
have good discriminative validity in distinguishing neurotypical adults from those with Asperger’s
Disorder and high-functioning autism. (Woodbury-Smith, et al., 2005). None of the control
participants’ scores on the AQ exceeded this suggested cutoff. Of the 13 participants in the ASD
group who completed the AQ, seven participants’ scores met or exceeded the cutoff and six
participants did not meet the cutoff. None of the participants were excluded on the basis of IQ
scores.
2.2.2

Procedure
For both institutions where the study was conducted, approval was obtained from

respective Institutional Review Boards. For many participants, all experimental testing and study
questionnaires were administered in a research laboratory in the Psychology Department of
Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia or in a private office at the University of Miami Miller
School of Medicine. However, the option of completing all study related tasks in participants’
homes was offered, in order to reduce the burden of finding transportation and paying for
parking. Several participants, both control and ASD, chose the latter option. In all cases when
study activities were conducted in participants’ homes, a distraction-free environment with
adequate furnishings and lighting was achieved. Total participation time was 2 ½ to 3 hours for
the ASD group and 2 to 2 ½ hours for the control group (due to not completing the ADOS).
Upon arrival at the study location, the participant received an explanation of the study
and consent and/or assent forms were reviewed verbally. Participants and in one case, an adult
ward and his legal guardians, were given ample time to read the consent and/or assent forms,
and ask questions when they arose. Participants (and legal guardian) indicated consent to
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participate by signing the appropriate forms. Participants completed preliminary screening and
questionnaires in order to ensure that they meet both inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Preliminary screening included an informal interview to collect demographic information, and to
inquire about histories of psychopathology, central nervous system disease, and brain injury or
tumor. Both ASD and control participants completed the AQ. Participants with ASD then
completed the ADOS, while a caregiver (if available) completed the SCQ. The ADOS-2
administration was video recorded to allow the PI to review responses after data collection had
been completed; these recordings were also useful in cases where consultation with the PI’s
mentor for ambiguous responses was required. Both groups of participants then completed the
2-subtest version of the WASI-II. Then, the experimental task and its associated practice runs
were completed by both groups. The PI and other study personnel guided the participants
through the practice runs in order to ensure that they understood the instructions. Practice runs
for each working memory condition were completed first using cards with stimuli printed on them
and then on a laptop computer. The experimental tasks were the same as the practice runs on
the laptop computer, but included more trials.
After completion of the experimental tasks, the participants were debriefed and allowed to
ask any questions they had about the experiment. Participants who completed study activities
were given a gift card to Target worth $10 (or $30.00 if they participated after compensation was
increased in attempt to increase enrollment).
2.2.3

Experimental task
The experimental task for the current study served as a model of social interaction, but

with tight experimental control. The 0-back task involves viewing a target stimulus that is
presented for a fixed amount of time, after which a series of other stimuli are presented. The
participant must indicate which items within the series match the initial target stimulus based on
a pre-determined dimension, and which do not. The 0-back condition is a slightly different
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measure than the 1-, 2-, and 2-back tasks, in that it measures maintenance memory or
vigilance, but does not involve continual updating of the to-be-remembered information as do
the 1-, 2- and 3- back conditions. The 0-back condition was included as a baseline for individual
differences in emotional expression matching, but was not included in the main analysis as a
key variable of interest.
Working memory was assessed using the n-back task. Stimuli consisted of cropped
photographs of faces (Tottenham et al., 2009). The NimStim Set of Facial Expressions is widely
used in both clinical and typical populations and includes a variety of facial expressions at both
high and low levels of intensity, and a variety of male and female actors from various racial
backgrounds. The initial validation and reliability study of the NimStim set yielded high
measures; kappa = .79 across emotions and test-retest reliability was 0.84.
Neta and Whalen (2011) also utilized the NimStim Set of Facial Expressions to compare
cortical activation for facial identity vs. emotion expression recognition within the context of an nback task, in a sample of normal controls. The current study partially follows their design in that
it includes n-back for emotional expression, but does not include a facial identity n-back
condition, and it extends the findings to the ASD population. However, as Krebs et al. (2011)
noted, ASD participants may be tempted to identify targets on the basis of irrelevant, peripheral
features, such as hairline or the presence of an earring. Therefore, NimStim photos were
cropped to eliminate as much extraneous visual information as possible to reduce this
likelihood.
The NimStim set includes photos of 43 male and female actors from a range of racial
backgrounds. The stimulus set depicts closed- and opened-mouth versions of happy, sad,
angry, fearful, calm, and neutral. Surprise is also included, but only has the opened-mouth
version. This yields a total of 688 stimuli. The current study only included the closed-mouth
versions of each of the emotions, to control for perceptual differences across the different
emotions, such as toothiness. Thus, the surprise expression was excluded, because there is no

31
closed mouth version. Neutral expression was also not included, as some studies have
demonstrated that neutral is often construed as a negative emotion (Tottenham et al., 2009).
The calm expression was used in place of neutral. This subset of photos contains a total of 258
stimuli, depicting six emotions from 43 different actors. With this number of stimuli available, it
was possible to ensure that no one stimulus was repeated in any of the experimental trials.
However, some of the stimuli that were used in the experimental trial were part of either the
practice tasks on paper or on the laptop. None of the practice stimuli appeared in the
experimental block with which it was paired. Stimulus duration was 2000 ms, following the
design of studies that closely resemble the proposed study in that they included NimStim faces
in an n-back task based on emotion (rather than identity) (Levens & Gotlib, 2010; Neta &
Whalen, 2011). Inter-stimulus Interval (ISI) was 1000 ms, as most of the n-back studies in
related literature using facial stimuli used this interval (Cohen et al., 1997; du Boisgueheneuc et
al., 2006; Hideya Koshino et al., 2008). Target to non-target ratio was 1:1 in order to allow
sufficient opportunity for behavioral responses to targets to be measured, which ensures
adequate power for repeated measures designs, as in other behavioral studies with similar
design (Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001; Phillips et al., 2001).
First, all participants completed an emotion matching practice task, to ensure adequate
emotional expression identification skills to complete more difficult delayed-match-to-sample (0back), and working memory tasks (1-, 2-, and 3-back). Stimuli printed on cards, one for each of
the six emotions, were displayed in a single row on the table in front of the participant, to
represent multiple choice options. Then the PI or lab assistant presented another stimulus that
matched one of the multiple choices displayed in front of the participant, in terms of emotional
expression. The participant was asked to select from the multiple choices which one had the
same emotional expression as the one the PI/lab assistant was presenting (target emotion).
This was repeated for each of the six emotions. In some instances, target emotion cards
matched one of the multiple choices in terms of facial identity but not in terms of emotional
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expression. This allowed the PI/lab assistant opportunity to point out that though the same
actors may be seen in the experiment, the task was to match based on emotional expression.
Only one participant from the ASD group had significant difficulty on this task, and therefore,
was excluded from participation. All other participants were able to complete this practice task
successfully.
Participants then completed practice and experimental trials for the 0-back task. This is a
delayed match-to-sample, or maintenance memory task, conducted to ensure that participants
had the ability to hold an emotional expression in memory for a short period of time. First, a
practice version was completed with stimuli printed on cards. A target emotion was presented
for approximately 2000 ms, and the participant was prompted to remember the emotional
expression. Then subsequent stimulus cards were presented one by one, whereas the
participant replied YES if the one they were viewing had the same emotional expression as the
target emotion initially presented, or replied NO if it was not the same emotion. If the participant
made a mistake, the task was paused and the target emotion was presented again briefly so
that the participant was allowed to give a second response. This process was repeated with
each of the six emotions as target emotions. There were 10 trials per emotion block, with the
target emotion appearing three times within each emotion block. The order in which the stimuli
were presented within a block was randomized. None of the participants made more than two
errors per emotion block and when a mistake was made, participants provided the correct
response on their second chance.
Next, a practice run for the 0-back condition was completed on the laptop. The
participant’s attention was directed to written instructions on the screen. Instructions were also
read aloud to the participants. The instructions read: “Look at this face. Remember the emotion
on this face. On the rest of the faces, press the YES button if it has the same emotion as the
first face or press the NO button if it is not the same emotion.” Then, the target stimulus
disappeared from the screen and a new face appeared with the prompt at the bottom of the
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screen than read “YES – same emotion as the first face. NO – not the same emotion as the first
face.” The YES key was labeled on the right side of the keyboard (/) and the NO key was on the
left (z). The stimulus and prompt remained on the screen until the participant selected their
response, after which they both disappeared. A new stimulus appeared, again with the prompt
at the bottom of the screen. After responding to this trial, subsequent trials appeared without the
prompt, and for a fixed length of time of 2000 ms with an interstimulus interval (blank screen) of
1000ms. Participants were warned that the remainder of the stimuli would “flash on the screen
quickly” so that they would be prepared to respond. The continuous stream of stimuli proceeded
at that rate regardless of whether or not the participant registered a response. For the majority
of participants, it took a few trials to become accustomed to the pace of trial presentation, such
that by the end of the first emotion block, all were responding during the 3000 ms stimulus +
interstimulus interval period. The order in which the practice 0-back emotion blocks was fixed: 1)
angry, 2) happy, 3) sad, 4) fearful, 5) disgust, and 6) calm. The practice 0-back run on the
laptop took approximately 3 minutes to complete.
Participants then completed the 0-back experiment on the laptop. For each emotion
block, 10 targets and 10 non-targets (two each of the five non-target emotions) were presented
in random order within each emotion block. Again, the order in which the target emotion blocks
were presented was fixed (see above). Stimulus presentation time was again 2000 ms with a
1000 ms blank-screen interstimulus interval. The 0-back run took approximately six minutes to
complete.
Participants then completed each of the remaining working memory load conditions twice.
With three working memory load condition, (1-back, 2-back, and 3-back), each performed twice,
there were six blocks, presented in two runs (A and B), with a short break in between runs. A
practice task with stimuli printed on cards, as well as a short practice task on the laptop
computer was completed before each of the six experiment blocks. The practice on cards was
discontinued if the participant responded correctly to three consecutive trials. For participants
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who made errors, the practice task was paused, and the target stimulus was briefly represented so that the participant could see the nature of their mistake. The purpose of the
practice with cards was to exclude participants who were unable to achieve roughly 70 percent
correct for the practice trials on cards. However, this was usually not the case for the 1- and 2back conditions. Participants in both groups had considerable difficulty with the 3-back
condition, though data collection ensued in order to evaluate systematically the value of
including such a difficult condition for future studies in this population. After the first few
participants’ data were collected, it became apparent that the practice task with stimuli on cards
was highly redundant for the 2nd run, as the participants clearly understood the task demands,
even if they felt they did not perform well, for example, on the 3-back condition. So, for the 2nd
run, the practice on cards was eliminated, whereas the practice on the laptop was performed for
both runs. As described above, none of the stimuli in the practice tasks (cards + laptop)
appeared in its associated experimental block.
The order in which the working memory load conditions were presented was
pseudorandomized by creating two runs (Run A and Run B), neither of which started with the
most difficult condition, the 3-back. The run order was counterbalanced within groups such that
half of the control participants were presented with Run A first and the other half were presented
with Run B first; the same was done for the ASD group. Each block included 18 targets and 18
non-targets, with three stimuli for each of the emotions within a block, which yields a total of 36
stimulus presentations within a block. This number also ensures that the ratio of target to nontarget is 1:1, thereby ensuring that the possibility of both “YES” and “NO” responses occurred
an equal number of times within a block. For a depiction of the experimental design and task,
see Figures 2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.2.
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Figure 2.2.3.1 Experimental design
Run A

Total
108
stimuli

108
stimuli

Figure 2.2.3.2. A depiction of the 2-back condition with cropped NimStim examples.

Participant data were double-entered, once in SPSS and once in Microsoft Excel and then
exported to SPSS in order to detect and rectify data-entry errors. The data were analyzed using
SPSS version 18. A mixed ANOVA with group as the between group variable and working
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memory load as the repeated measures variable was conducted. Two sets of analyses were
conducted: one with accuracy level as the dependent variable and one with reaction time as the
dependent variable. Post-hoc t-tests were conducted when appropriate.

3
3.1

RESULTS

Variables
Independent variables included group and working memory load. The between-group

variable consisted of two levels: ASD and controls. The repeated-measures variable consisted
of working memory load levels: 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back. Accuracy level calculated as
percent correct responses served as the primary dependent variable. Accuracy level was
operationalized as the total number of correct responses, divided by total number of trials for
which participants responded (correct + incorrect) x 100. Correct responses (YES for targets +
NO for non-targets) and incorrect responses (NO for targets + YES for non-targets) were
summed across the Run A and Run B blocks for each working memory load to create a
composite accuracy level percentage. Trials with no response were not included in this
calculation. Reaction time data were also collected and analyzed for exploratory purposes.
Reaction time was operationalized as the average time from stimulus onset to response across
all correct response trials within a working memory load condition (Run A and Run B) to create
a composite reaction time, presented in milliseconds. Means and standard deviations by group
and working memory load are presented in Table. 3.1.1. Performance in terms of accuracy level
and reaction time across working memory load levels is presented in figures 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
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Table 3.1.1 Means and standard deviations of percent correct, reaction time, and no response
trials by working memory load and group.
Control (n=29)
ASD (n=16)
Total (n=45)
0-back
82.23 (5.70)
71.73 (10.98)
78.49 (9.36)
1-back
80.65 (5.45)
68.40 (13.20)
76.30 (10.66)
% Correct
2-back
75.92 (10.87)
61.18 (8.51)
70.68 (12.28)
M (SD)
3-back
64.61 (10.69)
56.00 (7.72)
61.55 (10.51)
1- +2- +3-back
73.73 (7.79)
61.86 (8.66)
69.51 (9.85)
0-back
938.80 (124.12)
1023.03 (175.70) 968.77 (148.28)
1-back
986.79 (148.91)
991.91 (135.02)
988.61 (142.59)
Reaction
Time (ms)
2-back
1073.64 (167.86)
1033.23 (185.14) 1059.27 (173.20)
M (SD)
3-back
1100.70 (210.05)
962.95 (247.58)
1051.72 (231.13)
1- +2- +3-back
1053.71 (158.21)
1341.44 (162.65) 1033.20 (160.40)
0-back
3.21 (4.92)
5.25 (12.86)
3.93 (8.53)
No
1-back
1.00 (1.39)
1.2 (1.74)
1.07 (1.50)
Response
2-back
1.76 (3.28)
1.4 (2.41)
1.64 (2.99)
(raw)
3-back
2.45 (3.19)
1.27 (2.19)
2.05 (2.92)
M (SD)
1- +2- +3-back
5.21 (6.11)
3.87 (5.83)
4.75 (5.98)

100
95
90
85
80
Control

75

ASD

70
65
60

82.23

80.65
71.73

75.92
68.4
61.18

55
50
0-back

1-back

2-back

64.61
56
3-back

Figure 3.1.1. Mean accuracy level by group and working memory load.

38
1400
1300
1200
Controls

1100

ASD
1000
900

1033.23

1023.03

938.8

991.91

1073.64

1100.7

962.95

986.79

800
0-back

1-back

2-back

3-back

Figure 3.1.2. Mean reaction time by group and working memory load.
3.2

Accuracy Level Results
An independent samples t-test was conducted to test for a significant difference in accuracy

level between groups on the 0-back task. The normality assumption for 0-back distribution
within each group was checked and met. Levene’s test was conducted to check the assumption
of homogeneity of variance in the two groups. Results were significant indicating that variance in
the 0-back condition was significantly higher in the ASD than the control group, F (1, 43) =
12.949, p=.001. Results of the independent samples t-test (corrected for equal variances not
assumed) of accuracy level for the 0-back task revealed a significant group difference, t
(19.562) = 3.564, p=.002, d=1.2, with the control group having significantly higher accuracy
level. This was not predicted.
Differential patterns of performance, both within and between groups, were investigated
using a 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA to investigate main effects of group and working memory
load, plus interaction effects on accuracy level for 1-, 2-, and 3-back conditions. The assumption
of normality of distribution of scores within groups was met for all conditions except one. The
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distribution of accuracy level for the controls in the 1-back condition was non-normal. Given that
factorial ANOVA is robust to violations of this assumption and that all other distributions were
normal, data transformations were not performed. Specific to the requirements of a repeated
measures mixed design ANOVA, the assumption of sphericity was checked via a Mauchly’s test
and was met and Sidak correction method (an alternative to Bonferroni correction, used to
preserve power) for multiple comparisons was applied. There was a significant main effect of
group on accuracy level, F (1, 43) = 22.16, p<.001, partial Ƞ2= 0.34, with the ASD group
(M=61.86, SD=8.66) having a significantly lower accuracy level when collapsing across all
working memory load conditions than controls (M=73.73, SD=7.79). There was also a significant
main effect of working memory load, collapsing across both groups on percent correct F (2, 86)
= 52.09, p<.001, partial η2= 0.62. Contrasts revealed significant decreases in accuracy for the
entire sample as working memory load increased. The mean accuracy for 1-back (M=76.30,
SD=10.66) was significantly higher than for 2-back (M=70.68, SD=12.28), F (1,43) = 19.57,
p<.001, partial η 2 = .313, and mean 2-back accuracy level was significantly higher than 3-back
(M=61.55, SD=10.51), F (1,43) = 34.269, p<.001, partial η 2 = .444. There was no significant
interaction effect of Group x Working Memory load on accuracy level, F (2, 86)=2.43, p=.094,
partial η 2 = .053. See tables 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 for results.

Table 3.2.1 Between subjects effects for percent correct as DV.
Variable
Df
F
Sig
Partial Ƞ2
Intercept
1
2889.34
p<.001
.985
GROUP
1
22.16
p<.001
.340
Error
43
196.83

Observed Power
1.00
.996

Table 3.2.2. Within subjects effects for percent correct as DV.
Variable
Df
F
Sig
WM LOAD
2
52.09
p<.001
WM LOAD* GROUP
2
2.43
p=.094
Error
86
40.37

Observed Power
1.00
.477

Partial Ƞ2
.548
.053
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In order to explore the relationship between maintenance memory for emotional
expression, as measured by the 0-back task, and working memory (1-, 2-, and 3-back tasks),
partial correlations were conducted, controlling for the effect of group. Positive correlations
between 0-back and each of the working memory tasks were revealed. Strong positive
relationships were found between 0-back and 1-back accuracy levels (r=.597, p<.001) and
between 0-back and 2-back (r=.413, p=.005), whereas a moderate positive relationship between
0-back and 3-back was observed (r=.306, p=.044). See table 3.2.5.
Table 3.2.3. Partial correlations between 0-back and each of 1-, 2- and 3-back, controlling for
group.
Partial r (2-tailed)
Sig
df
1-back
.597
p<.001
42
2-back
.413
p=.005
42
3-back
.306
p=.044
42

To investigate possible differences between in the relationship between maintenance
memory and working memory accuracy further, data were analyzed separately by groups. In the
control group, none of the working memory load condition accuracy levels was significantly
correlated with 0-back accuracy. However, for the ASD group, the 1-back and 2-back levels, but
not the 3-back, working memory load accuracy level, were significantly, positively, and strongly
correlated with 0-back accuracy. See Table 3.2.6.

Table 3.2.4. Pearson correlations between 0-back and each of 1-, 2- and 3-back, separately by
group.
Pearson’s r (2-tailed)
Sig
Control
1-back
.356
p=.058
2-back
.279
p=.143
3-back
.289
p=.116
ASD
1-back
.699
p=.003*
2-back
.675
p=.004*
3-back
.401
p=.123
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Due to these significant correlations within the ASD group, a repeated-measures
ANOVA with 0-back as a covariate was conducted for the ASD group. For exploratory purposes,
the same analysis was conducted for the control group. Results for the ASD group, indicate that
the main effect of n-back level was non-significant, after covarying for 0-back performance F
(2,28) =.447, p =.644, partial η 2=.031. Similarly for the control group, the main effect of n-back
level was also non-significant after covarying for 0-back performance F (2,54) =.469, p =.628,
partial η 2=.017..
Table 3.2.5. Control group repeated-measures ANOVA of n-back level with 0-back as covariate.
Variable
Df
F
Sig
Partial η2
Observed Power
n-back level
2
.469
.628
.017
.123
n-back level * 0-back
2
.121
.886
.004
.068
Error
54

Table 3.2.6. ASD group repeated-measures ANOVA of n-back level with 0-back as covariate.
Variable
Df
F
Sig
Partial η 2
Observed Power
n-back level
2
.447
.644
.031
.116
n-back level * 0-back
2
2.080
.144
.129
.391
Error
28

Closer inspection of the distribution of scores and the changes from 1-back, to 2-back, to
3-back reveals that performance changes were highly variable. Most control participants (n=19,
65.5%) demonstrated the expected linear, downward trend in accuracy as the working memory
load increased, whereas some control group participants (n=7, 24.1%) performed more
accurately on 2-back than 1-back and others (n=3, 10.3%) were more accurate on the 3-back
condition than on the 2-back condition. In the ASD group, there were also some (n=4, 25%) who
were more accurate on 2-back than 1-back and some (n=3, 18.8%) whose 3-back performance
was more accurate than their 2-back. Whereas the control group’s 3-back accuracy
performance exhibited high variability in comparison to its 1-back performance (3-back SD
almost twice the SD for 1-back), the opposite pattern is seen in the ASD group, with more
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variability in 1-back than 3-back accuracy performance. It is also notable that several control
(n=5, 17%) and ASD (n=6, 37.5%) participants performed at near-chance levels of accuracy
(<55% accuracy) in the 3-back condition. See Figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
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Figure 3.2.1. Individual control group participants’ accuracy (% correct) performance change
from 1-back, to 2-back, to 3-back
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Figure 3.2.2. Individual ASD group participants’ accuracy (% correct) performance change from
1-back, to 2-back, to 3-back.

Given that the control group’s VIQ (M=56.34, SD=7.911) was significantly higher than
the ASD group’s (M=48.69, SD=11.394), Pearson correlations were calculated between VIQ
and each of the task conditions for each group separately. VIQ was not significantly correlated
with accuracy performance on any of the task conditions for the control group (all ps>.05). In the
ASD group, VIQ was only significantly correlated with 2-back performance (r=.648, p=.007).
Table 3.2.7. Pearson correlations between VIQ (T-score) and each task condition.
Control (N=29)
ASD (N=16)
r (2-tailed)
Sig
r (2-tailed)
Sig
0-back
.262
.170
.432
.095
1-back
.356
.248
.364
.166
2-back
.266
.163
.648
.007
3-back
.230
.231
.426
.100

3.3

Reaction Time Results
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Reaction times for correct trials only were included in the analyses; reaction times for trials
on which the participants responded incorrectly were excluded. An independent t-test was
conducted for the 0-back task. Assumptions of normally distributed scores and homogeneity of
variance was met for both groups. Results indicated that the difference between groups in
reaction time was not significant for the 0-back task (see Table 3.3.3). Differential patterns of
performance, both within and between groups with reaction time as the dependent variable
were investigated using a 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA. The assumption of normally distributed
scores within groups was met for all conditions. The sphericity assumption was met for the main
effect of group, but was not met for working memory load. Therefore, the Greenhouse-Geisser
correction method was applied to the main effect of working memory load condition. There was
no significant main effect of group on reaction time overall, F (1,43) = 1.34, p=.253, partial η 2=
.03. In contrast, there was a significant main effect of working memory load, F (1.703, 3.56),
p=.04, partial η 2= 0.076. Contrasts revealed that reaction times for 1-back (M=988.61, SD=142.
59) were significantly faster than reaction times for 2-back (M=1059.27, SD=173.20), F (1, 43),
p=.007, partial η 2=.160. However, 2-back reaction times were not significantly different from 3back reaction times (M=1051.72, SD=231.13), F (1, 43), p=.311, partial η 2=.024. Finally, a
significant interaction effect for group x working memory load was found, F (1.703, 73.217),
p=.02, partial η 2= .094. See tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for results.
Table 3.3.1. Between subjects effects for reaction time as DV.
Variable
Df
F
Sig
Intercept
1
1697.04
p<.001
GROUP
1
1.34
p=.253
Error
43

Partial η 2
.975
.03

Observed Power
1.00
.205

Table 3.3.2. Within subjects effects for reaction time as DV.
Variable
Df
F
Sig
WM LOAD
1.703
3.56
p=.04

Partial Ƞ2
.076

Observed Power
.597
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WM LOAD* GROUP
Error

1.703
73.217

4.46

p=.02

.094

.700

Post-hoc independent samples t-tests were conducted to explore simple main effects, to
see for which working memory load condition(s) the group difference in reaction time was
significant. Results were not significant for any of the working memory load conditions, meaning
that the two groups did not differ significantly in reaction time within any of the working memory
levels (see Table 3.3.3).

Table 3.3.3. Independent samples t-tests for between group differences for each working
memory load.
95% Confidence Interval
Variable
Df
t
Sig
Lower
Upper
1-back
43
-.114
.910
-95.697
85.456
2-back
43
.745
.460
-69.919
149.744
3-back
43
1.976
.055
-2.839
278.343

Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether reaction times for
any of the working memory load conditions differed, within each group separately. For the
control group, the sphericity assumption was not met, so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction
method was applied, and the Sidak correction method (a less conservative alternative to
Bonferroni correction that preserves power) for multiple comparisons was applied. The results
indicate that the control group’s increase in reaction time from 1- to 2-back was significant, F
(1,28) = 13.455, p=.001, partial η 2.325, but the increase from 2- to 3-back was not significant, F
(1,28) = 1.247, p=.274, partial η 2.043. (See Table 3.3.4). For the ASD group, neither was the
increase in reaction time from 1- to 2-back F (1, 15) = .784, p=.390, partial η 2=.050, nor was the
decrease from 2- to 3-back significant (see Table 3.3.5).

Table 3.3.4. Repeated measures ANOVA for control group reaction time comparisons from 1- to
2 and from 2- to 3-back
Variable
Df
F
Sig
Partial η 2 Observed Power
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WM Load
Error

1- to 2-back
2- to 3-back
1- to 2-back
2- to 3-back

1
1
28
28

13.455
1.247

.001
.274

.325
.043

.943
.190

Table 3.3.5. Repeated measures ANOVA for ASD group reaction time comparisons from 1- to 2
and from 2- to 3-back
Variable
Df
F
Sig
Partial η 2 Observed Power
WM Load
1- to 2-back
1
.784
.390
.050
.132
2- to 3-back
1
3.795
.070
.202
.446
Error
1- to 2-back
15
2- to 3-back
15

The near chance-level accuracy performance in the ASD group for the 3-back condition
raises the question of whether these participants found this condition particularly difficult and
subsequently did not put forth much effort on this particular condition. One way to investigate
this possibility would be to assume that increased effort as evidenced by increased reaction
time, results in higher accuracy. This would suggest positive correlations between reaction time
and accuracy, particularly for the more difficult conditions. This was not the case (see Table
3.3.6). The possibility that the ASD group’s faster rate of responding is an indicator of low effort,
or giving up because the task was simply too difficult cannot be ruled out. Another way to
interpret the pattern of reaction time across the working memory load conditions is that the ASD
group did not utilize a strategized approach to their responses, as evidenced by lack of
significant differences in reaction time across the working memory load conditions, whereas the
control group increased effort by slowing down when the difficulty of the task increased to a
certain point, as evidenced by a significant increase in reaction time from 1- to 2-back
conditions. The lack of significance in the control group’s increase from 2- to 3-back may be
evidence that they too, gave up on the 3-back condition.

Table 3.3.6. Pearson correlations for accuracy (%correct) and reaction time, by working memory
load and group.
Group
WM Load
Pearson’s r (2-tailed)
Sig.
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Control

0-back
1-back
2-back
3-back
0-back
1-back
2-back
3-back

ASD

4
4.1

r=-.140
r=.254
r=.434
r=.328
r=-.068
r=.588
r=.262
r=.211

p=.468
p=.185
p=.019
p=.083
p=.802
p=.017
p=.327
p=.432

DISCUSSION

Results Discussion
The purpose of the study was to investigate working memory for facial expression of

emotion in ASD. This was accomplished by using the n-back task with cropped photographs
from validated set of facial expression stimuli, NimStim (Tottenham et al., 2009). The task
served as an experimental model of a social interaction, in that it requires short-term memory
and moment-to-moment updating (working memory) of socially and emotionally relevant
information. This kind of skill has been referred to as “hot” executive functioning, as opposed to
“cool” executive functioning which involves various aspects of cognitive control for abstract,
decontextualized information (Barendse et al., 2013; Zelazo et al., 2010).
The results of the current study suggest that participants with ASD were able to
recognize and remember emotional expressions over short periods of time, as evidenced by
better than chance-level accuracy on the 0-back task. However, the ASD group did so with
significantly less accuracy than control individuals, in contrast to expectations. Despite previous
findings of intact ability to recognize the basic facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 2001; Jones et
al., 2011) without time constraints and intact short-term visual memory for objects (Blair, Frith,
Smith, Abell, & Cipolotti, 2002; Boucher & Lewis, 1989), the current results suggest that shortterm memory for facial expressions when the stimulus exposure time is limited is impaired in
young adults with ASD.
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As expected, both controls and participants with ASD demonstrated progressively poorer
accuracy with increasing difficulty of the task. Both groups had significant difficulty with the most
challenging condition, the 3-back, as evidenced by near chance-level (defined as <55%
accuracy) performance either as a group (ASD) or by several individual participants within the
group (ASD and controls). It appears that extension of the n-back with facial expressions of
emotion to the 3-back level constitutes too difficult a task to yield meaningful results, at least
with the exposure time of 2 s. It is unknown whether or not increasing exposure time would
facilitate performance at this level of working memory load.
Those in the ASD group had significant difficulty maintaining and conducting moment-tomoment updating of emotional expressions. Contrary to expectation, participants with ASD did
not perform as accurately as controls in the 1-back condition. The 1-back level of the task
requires less specificity in emotion recognition, as it can be successfully completed by merely
detecting when two of the same emotions appear back-to-back rather than by rapidly identifying
and maintaining memory of multiple exact emotions. Thus, it can be argued that the 1-back,
similar to the 0-back , is not a true test of working memory, in that it does not demand as much
manipulation as the 2- and 3-back do. The results suggests that even at the 1-back level,
participants with ASD already demonstrate deficits, more than two standard deviations below
the control group’s mean. Thus, it was not surprising that the ASD group also performed
significantly less accurately than the control group in the 2-back condition as well. Further, the
finding that the ASD group demonstrated poor performance at the least challenging level, the 1back, with 1 SD below group mean being near chance level, as well as at the 2-back level,
suggests a floor effect for n-back when the task requires judgments about facial expressions, for
individuals with ASD. In contrast, the control group performed relatively well at the 2-back level,
whereas like the ASD group, their performance in the 3-back condition approached chance-level
accuracy rates, which suggests a floor effect for typically developing individuals at the 3-back
level.
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The demonstrated pattern of accuracy performance stands in stark contrast to the lack
of group differences in the Koshino et al. (2008) study of 0-, 1- and 2-back for facial identity in
individuals with ASD vs, neurotypical controls. In the current study, group differences were
found at even the lowest n-back load condition. The current study’s ASD group accuracy
performance from 0-, 1-, and 2-back for emotional expression ranged from 72% to 61% correct,
whereas Koshino et al.’s (2008) ASD group’s accuracy performance for facial identity ranged
from 96% to 87.5% correct. Control groups’ performance in these two studies also reveal a
similar pattern, with poorer performance for emotional expression 0-, 1-, and 2-back (82% to
76% correct) than for facial identity 0-, 1-, and 2-back (96% to 84% correct). Thus, across both
ASD and control participants, accuracy levels in the current study are lower than what has been
found in the only other study using faces in an n-back task in an ASD sample. Further, Cui et al.
(2010) reported ASD group accuracy performance on 1- and 2-back for digits ranged from 89%
to 69% correct and Williams et al.’s (2005) finding that error rates were so low in n-back for
geometric for participants in both ASD and control groups that the authors did not pursue
analyses for accuracy data. In sum, the results appear to indicate that the n-back incorporating
judgments of emotional expression is more difficult than n-back for facial identity or other stimuli
such as geometric shapes or letters. One possible explanation regarding the current study’s
findings of much lower accuracy than in other studies is that the current study’s task involved
systematic variation of both facial identity and emotional expression. Previous studies provide
evidence of asymmetrical influence of facial identity on recognition of emotional expression but
not vice versa (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2011; Schweinberger & Soukup, 1998). In the
current study, the systematic variation of facial identity within across all working memory tasks
(no repetition of any actor/expression combination was repeated within any of the 1-, 2-, and 3back blocks) was an approach to address confounds in the Koshino et al. (2008) study, where
participants may have been able to successfully recognize facial identity based on differences in
emotional expression and other extranous details (person X has glasses and is always smiling,
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person Y has a tie and is not smiling). However, including variations in facial identity, even
though it was done in a systematic manner, may have unintentionally introduced an added layer
of categorical judgment to the task that was required to be suppressed in order to respond to
emotional expression only. Doing so may have increased the difficulty significantly more than if
facial identity were to have been held constant across all tasks.
Inspection of the pattern of individual participants’ performance across the three working
memory load conditions within just the control group, revealed a curious finding. Several control
participants were more accurate in the 2-back condition than they were in the 1-back condition,
and a few were more accurate in the 3-back than the 2-back condition. This same pattern was
found in the ASD group, for a small subset of participants. It could be interpreted that
participants were caught “off guard” by the difficulty of the task in the 1-back condition, and
subsequently resolved to increase effort for 2-back task, which thereby increased their
accuracy. However, the order of working memory load condition was pseudorandomized and
the run order was counterbalanced within groups. In other words, half of the group actually
completed the 2-back as their very first experimental condition, and the other half completed the
1-back first. Thus, any order effect should have been eradicated by the counterbalanced
administration. Further, of those who demonstrated this curious finding, approximately half were
from the group whose first task was the 1-back and half were for the other group, the one that
completed the 2-back first (the 3-back was not administered to any participant as a first task).
This suggests that the task order does not impact performance. Alternatively, the 2-back may
have been more interesting and engaging for some participants, prompting increased effort and
higher accuracy for those individuals.
Correlations between baseline maintenance or vigilance memory (0-back) and each of
the working memory load conditions were also examined to explore the relationship between
working memory and emotion recognition further, and findings were significant. When repeatedmeasures ANOVA covarying for 0-back performance were run for each group separately, the
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main effects of n-back level were no longer significant. This finding indicates that the accuracy
level performance patterns seen in the current study are attributable in large part to underlying
difficulty in maintenance or vigilance memory for facial expressions, and less so to working
memory per se.
The reaction time analyses also revealed interesting and informative results. Though the
main effects paint a picture of comparable reaction time between groups for all conditions
combined, and the expected significant increase in reaction time as working memory load
increased, the post-hoc analyses to explore significant interaction effects further reveal a more
interesting picture. There were no group differences in reaction time within any given working
memory load condition. This is consistent with the findings of Koshino and colleagues (2008),
but stands in contrast to other findings of significantly slower reaction times in the ASD group
(Cui et al., 2010; Williams, Goldstein, Carpenter, et al., 2005). Within group analyses for the
control group revealed that the increase in reaction time from 1- to 2-back was significant, but
from 2- to 3-back was not significant. In contrast, for the ASD group, neither the increase from
1- to 2-back nor from 2- to 3-back was significant. This pattern of results seems to suggest that
the control group applied a strategy of slower, more careful responding as the difficulty of the
task increased, whereas the ASD group did not demonstrate this strategy, but rather responded
to each of the levels with the same amount of consideration and effort.
The executive functioning theory, places the primacy of dysfunction solidly within the
cognitive domain. However, this theory has been criticized with the argument that executive
functioning is a broad domain composed of separable, component skills, each of which may or
may not be disrupted in ASD. That being said, the vast majority of researchers who seek to
investigate the viability of this theory seem to either take a domain-general approach or at best,
compares results from tasks that include verbal vs. nonverbal stimuli. These tasks are often
abstract and do not contain overtly social or emotional features, and have been referred to as
“cool” executive functioning (Zelazo et al., 2010).
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In contrast to the executive functioning theory, the social-cognitive theories of ASD focus
more on social deficits, which are present early in development. This argument is rooted in the
fact that humans are fundamentally social beings and our very survival depends on learning
from social interactions in our environment, both directly and indirectly. The ability to deduce
information from multiple sources that is often consistent but sometimes inconsistent, in our
interactions provides a richness that is unique to the human experience. Facial expressions of
emotion are one such type of stimuli and, generally speaking, are universally displayed and
understood (Darwin, 1955; Ekman, 1973). For both of these theories, studies have produced
equivocal results, with some demonstrating intact abilities and some revealing clear deficits.
Historically, cognition and emotion were regarded as separate entities in psychological
research, though some researchers have investigated emotion-cognition integration and have
found intriguing neural activation patterns that are entirely distinct from the expected additive
activation patterns of two separate areas associated with each domain alone. Successful social
interactions depend on fluid negotiation of attention resources and the ability to continually
update those various sources of information, in order to formulate an appropriate response,
according to the demands of the situation. This ability to maintain and manipulate information
over short periods of time is considered working memory. Indeed, at the behavioral level, some
have suggested successful adaptive and social functioning depends on adequate executive
functioning skills (Gilotty et al., 2002; McEvoy et al., 1993). This brings us back to the idea of
working memory skills required to negotiate successfully the myriad cues within a social
interaction, particularly when facial expressions change from moment to moment and one must
be capable of maintaining and updating that information. Executive functioning as applied to
tasks that involve motivational or affective aspects have been referred to as “hot” executive
functioning (Zelazo et al., 2010), which has gained little attention in terms of research on the
ASD population. Gaining a better understanding about “hot” executive functioning has the
potential to inform interventional approaches to social skills training programs.
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The extant literature leaves several questions unanswered, which the present study
addresses. For example, if individuals are specifically instructed to pay attention to the
emotional expression and all other social cues are eliminated, can individuals with ASD
maintain representations of those expressions over short periods of time, much like what is
required in a social interaction when expressions are transient and variable? Furthermore, can
they update, from moment to moment, changes in emotional expression, over the course of
time? If so, what is the limit of that ability to continually update and maintain that information?
This kind of specific emotion-cognition integration task has been investigated in ASD, but the
focus was on the neural activation patterns rather than on behavioral differences (Koshino et al.,
2008). Also, the stimuli employed in the task were less than ideal for the ASD population, as
they included many extraneous details that had high potential to pull for distracted responses,
given the propensity for local, over global processing in ASD, and directing attention to nonsocial, non-emotional aspects of visual scenes. Yet other studies have used more
methodologically rigorous approaches, but have not applied the study to individuals with ASD
(Neta and Whalen, 2011). In the current study, I aimed to address these questions.
The present findings stand in contrast to those from other studies that have
demonstrated comparable ability to recognize emotional expressions by individuals with ASD
vs. controls (Adolphs et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Weng
et al., 2011). However, as Kennedy and Adolphs (2012) posited, subtle differences in specificity
of and reliability in recognizing facial expressions may be magnified when the stimuli are
constrained in some way, so as to be more akin to naturalistic interactions, for example by
limiting exposure time or by using dynamic faces. The current findings appear to support that
hypothesis. An alternative explanation to the current findings of poorer performance in the ASD
group on each and every task condition, could be an overall difference in processing speed,
which has been previously demonstrated in other studies (Mayes & Calhoun, 2008; OliverasRentas et al., 2012); Schmitz, Daly & Murphy, 2007). However, the lack of group differences in
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reaction time, suggests that this is an insufficient explanation for the pattern of findings. Another
alternative explanation to the current findings may be a more basic deficit in sustained visual
attention in the ASD group. However, exploratory analyses revealed that the groups did not
significantly differ in number of trials to which they failed to register a response. Finally, the ASD
group’s consistently poorer performance across all tasks could be explained by a failure to use
a verbally-mediated strategy to augment their working memory performance. Indeed, the control
group’s verbal IQ was significantly higher than the ASD group’s, but the lack of significant
correlations between verbal IQ and any of the task conditions in the control group argues
against this explanation.
The current findings include demonstrated deficits in maintenance memory for emotional
expressions, despite previous findings of intact performance on the two separately. The aim of
the current study was to investigate performance on a task that simultaneously draws on both
emotion recognition and working memory skills, also called “hot” executive functioning.
However, underlying foundational difficulty in short-term memory for emotional expressions was
discovered. Therefore, inferences regarding true working memory that requires not only shortterm maintenance or vigilance memory, but also moment to moment updating of that
information are not easily made.
With regard to the two major theories of ASD described in the literature review sections,
the executive functioning theory and the social-cognitive theory, the pattern of results presented
here seem to provide some evidence in support of the latter, given evidence in the literature for
intact n-back performance in ASD for non-social/non-emotional stimuli, or “cool” executive
functioning. Though previous research failed to reveal group differences in ASD vs. controls
using a task of “hot” executive functioning (Koshino et al., 2008), the findings may have been
confounded due to the possibility of the ASD group performing the task using a strategy of
recognizing visual stimuli via non-face details, which limits interpretation of the results as
evidence for intact working memory for faces in ASD. The current study eliminated such
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extraneous non-face details such that participants were limited to only socially/emotionally
relevant information to perform the task, which makes the task more likely to be a measure of
“hot” executive functioning. However, the interpretation of the current findings are also limited
with regard to working memory for emotional expression, or “hot” executive functioning due to
the high degree of difficulty introduced by varying facial identity and emotion expression
simultaneously. Thus, the ASD group’s difficulty at the most basic level of maintenance or
vigilance for emotional expression (0-back and arguably, 1-back) precludes firm conclusions
regarding the more challenging, working memory conditions (2- and 3-back). Finally, the current
study furthers our knowledge regarding the difficulties individuals face in interacting socially in
the world when there are multiple sources of information, which change from moment to
moment, and place significant demands on not only cognitive but also social skills, which are
not always separate, either behaviorally or neutrally.
4.2

Limitations
The current study’s findings are limited by significant differences in race and sex between

the control and ASD groups. Almost half of the control group members were African American,
whereas none of the ASD group were. Race was not systematically controlled in the set of
stimuli used for the experimental tasks. Given extant literature on own-race bias in facial identity
recognition (Meissner & Brigham, 2001), it is possible that own-race bias may have an impact
on emotion recognition, and could explain some of the results of the current study.
The control group was almost exclusively female, despite efforts to recruit males,
whereas over half of ASD group was male. Notably, the composition of the ASD group is not
unexpected given established sex ratio differences in the general population; however, it proved
difficult to recruit a sex-matched sample of controls. Potential sex differences in emotion
recognition accuracy and efficiency may explain some of the results, but were not explored as
part of the current study.
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Another limitation is underpowered interaction analyses, despite utilizing a sample size
that is comparable to other similar studies that have yielded significant behavioral results (Cui et
al., 2010; Gabig, 2008; Goldberg et al., 2005; Kana et al., 2007; Landa & Goldberg, 2005;
Lopez et al., 2005; Nakahachi et al., 2006). However, the small effect size for the interaction
term in the accuracy level analysis suggests that it is unlikely that the results would have
achieved significance for the group by working memory load interaction had several more
participants’ data been collected. Additionally, repeated-measures ANOVA is an effective
method to compensate for small sample sizes.
4.3

Future Directions
Future studies may benefit from the methodological approach of using a validated set of

facial expressions that is consistent in terms of orientation and zoom but that has extraneous
details removed as is done in the present study, in order to explore potential differing neural
activation patterns between individuals with ASD and controls for maintenance or vigilance
memory for emotional expressions. Also, investigations of “hot” executive functioning in ASD
focusing on other component processes, such as inhibition (which has been shown to be intact
in ASD for “cool” stimuli) for socially or emotionally relevant information may shed light on
higher-order social interaction difficulties that are the hallmark of ASD. Additionally, studies of
intervention approaches may consider limiting working memory tasks to 0-, 1-, and 2-back
conditions, as training for success on 3-back conditions may prove to be fruitless and
frustrating, particularly for complex visual stimuli.
Future investigations may extend the current findings and how they may generalize to
real-world social interaction in individuals with ASD. For example, the relationship between
social interaction scores on the ADOS or other ASD-specific measures and performance on
tasks designed to measure “hot” executive function may be informative. Also, “hot” executive
function task performance may serve as a pre- and post-intervention measure for social skills
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training programs. Future studies may include more fine-grained analyses to investigate the
effect of affective valence, sex of the model in the stimulus, or the match/mismatch of the race
of the stimulus model and the participant on accuracy or reaction time, given the extant
literature for these kinds of investigations in the typically developing population.
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